Lada wrote:
Стоки, акции, опционы, инвестиции, торги на бирже, рассчёт взлетов и падений цен. Блин, ну так мне это тяжело дается - хоть сдохни тут.
А они не рассчитываются. Там своя клоака, если ты не в ней то ты снаружи. Остальное - бубны с плясками для того чтобы сделать вид что все честно, и пара трюков на которые изредка может рассчитывать обыватель.
Эдит: Хотя нет! Если смогу, просканирую насчет этого одну статью. Она не утешит но разьяснит.
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
January 16, 1999 Saturday
Why analysts are almost always wrong - and still get paid for it
BYLINE: DUNNERY BEST
SECTION: ROB COLUMN; INVESTING ON STOCKS; Pg. B7
LENGTH: 901 words
According to Institutional Investor, the U.S. bible of the money management industry, analysts are ranked on many skills, including industry knowledge, quality of writing and stock selection. Way down the scale, in fact ranked as 7th (out of eight) most important for managers with assets of $5- to $10-billion (U.S.), is earnings forecasts. Which is a good thing, because most of the time those estimates are quite wrong.
Professional investors don't fault the analyst for error, nor the quality of his financial models. Institutional players grudgingly accept reality: Market conditions are in a constant state of flux. Any one of a multitude of variables can force large-scale forecast revisions. Canadian companies, with their export and commodity exposure, are especially vulnerable.
Nevertheless, the divergence of forecasts from ultimate reality is a major complication, particularly for individual investors. Macro targets, such as a one-year outlook for the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index, are heavily influenced by the collective wisdom of analysts. If targets are low, because of soft earnings growth expectations, investors may opt to stand back, hoping for a market pullback to provide a better opportunity to invest. Their risk is being left behind in a rally. Alternatively, overly optimistic expectations could encourage investment when caution is a better strategy.
Specifically, earnings forecasts for the TSE 300 index of companies invariably undergo enormous revision, almost always downward. For instance, TSE 300 earnings for 1998 will likely come in at $294 or below. A year earlier, the consensus estimate for year-end 1998 was $436. (TSE 300 earnings are calculated by adding up the share earnings for each of the constituent companies, once they've been weighted to reflect the difference in market capitalization. So, BCE Inc.'s share earnings carry more weight than, say, Jannock Inc.)
This accuracy problem is not the exclusive domain of the TSE 300. A recent study reported in the Financial Analysts Journal showed that in the 12-year period ended Dec. 30, 1997, the average consensus 12-month share earnings growth forecast for the S&P 500 was 17.7 per cent, more than twice the actual growth rate during the period. Just as in Canada, earnings forecasts in the United States start high, and subsequently undergo continuous revision, generally downward.
On a company-specific basis, earnings may be dramatically affected by factors such as orders that failed to materialize, labour strife, a lawsuit that unexpectedly balloons into an absurdly high jury settlement, or even internal fraud suddenly revealed with catastrophic consequence. In cutting-edge industries, forecasting is always vastly complicated. In many cases, an analyst's ability to identify the technological trends and potential growth rates is more critical than precision in forecasting distant earnings prospects.
On a sector basis, a whole new range of possibilities gets added to the mix. A change in the price of a key commodity such as crude oil can have enormous impact on individual company results and on the overall performance of the index. Gold prices or supplies of key base metals such as nickel, copper and zinc are also enough to rattle the TSE 300 index performance. Indeed, collapsed commodity values was most of the reason that the TSE 300 earnings came in way below forecast in 1998.
In Canada and the United States, studies show that the most important variable is the economy. When Canada was in the throes of the recession of 1990-1992, TSE earnings virtually vanished. This was the result of poor operating results, combined with major writeoffs, especially of real estate as corporations pruned their balance sheets of assets that had no hope of recovering their value.
Investors are generally more incensed about faulty forecasting on a company-by-company basis than when an entire sector is clobbered. That's because the human element becomes paramount.
Several detailed studies have suggested compelling reasons why U.S. analysts tend to be overly positive in their forecasts. One study cited in the Financial Analysts Journal suggests that analysts, in a disarmingly human response, may instinctively "fall in love" with companies they cover, which could dull their critical faculties.
Another suggestion is that analysts reserve or moderate harsh judgment in order to preserve their relationship with management, and maintain the full flow of information. An alternative possibility is that analysts may sometimes succumb to a "herding" instinct, and find themselves carried along by a general enthusiasm.
The best analysts are aware of these human frailties, and are resolute in resisting them. But, it takes a very determined and hard-nosed number-cruncher to break away from the pack, particularly when the divergent path is to adopt a negative bias. Outright sells are frustratingly rare in this business.
In the tightly knit world of securities analysts and the institutional investors who consume their research, sloppy analysis is summarily disciplined. Whereas independent and prescient thought is rewarded with stratospheric compensation.
Institutional investors don't pay for herd mentality.
Dunnery Best is is a senior vice-president and director of Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. Merrill Lynch Canada may provide advice or underwriting services to companies mentioned in this column.
alpolo wrote:
все понимаю, но почему Орел?
А чтоб ты спросил.